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The article is devoted to the relations between the phenomenology and the rhetoric. Edmund 
Husserl some hundred years ago explored, described, and then used in his eidetic phenomenology 
the noteworthy ability of every author to create the imaginary objects by the ordinary words. Today 
we try to find out in the classical texts by Husserl the useful hint on where is the best way or method 
to pass through the words and to recover the possibility to see clear. Consequently, the aim of 
this article is to define and to describe the possible paths through the illusions of the so-called 
direct speech to the insight of the idea as it is. As long as the subject matter of the paper is the 
very transformative process that transmutes the existing words into the non-existing images, we 
must make a conclusion in a form of the choice. This choice is predetermined by own Husserl’s 
description of the so-called «free variations in phantasy». We consider these variations to be the 
rhetorical resistance to the ordinary words, a kind of rubber that layer-by-layer moves forced or 
erased metaphors away.
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Introduction
Despite the fact, that Husserl’s theory of 
phantasy goes back to his early texts written 
before 1900 it is still worth looking at. The number 
of the publications of the last decades shows 
this judgment to be true. I urge that this interest 
attracted by the old, but not forgotten theory to 
be closely connected with the contemporary 
problems of the so-called «visual culture» and 
its impact over the social communication. The 
authors usually prefer to discuss the details of 
the different interpretations of the Husserl’s 
method of clarification. I will try to pass from 
the reflections on method to the investigation of 
the troublesome relations between the words used 
and the images produced.
Theoretical framework
Since Descartes evidence is one of the 
most important themes of all the tradition of the 
modern Western philosophy. In order to achieve 
both theoretical truth and practical validity the 
scientists or the philosophers have to provide 
their first principles to be evident. The way to 
the evident principles may seem rather simple: 
the one who wants to formulate them must 
simply doubt in every proposition that does not 
seem obvious or clear just from the beginning. 
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However, since the times of Franz Brentano and 
his disciples we know that this path leads to the 
painful question whether one evident statement 
may be more or less radical than the other one. 
In its turn the comparison between the equally 
evident but controversial statements throws us 
back to the new search for the method that make 
the gaze clear enough to see not the phantoms, 
but the things themselves.
Statement of problems
The philosophers of the last century as well 
as their predecessors in the previous centuries 
usually have dreamt about the solid foundations to 
load them with their extraordinary argumentation. 
They would have liked to deduce the necessary 
(or, at least, universally valid) conclusions based 
on the firm principles. They usually have sought 
for such clarity of vision, such focal point, or 
such concentration, which would have allowed 
seeing the things as they have been and thus have 
guaranteed the approach to the necessary (or at 
least conventional) truths in the course of further 
argumentation. A philosopher of nowadays has 
to provide the clear gaze, like that which had 
discerned his greatest predecessors, and only then 
he can turn to the conscious construction of the 
world, to the application of the rules of logic, to 
the struggle against his enemies with the help of 
all defensive and offensive techniques of eristic.
The stare becomes clear in two fundamentally 
different, though related, situations. One of 
them is the situation of naïve amazement, which 
Aristotle had determined in one of the well-
known places of his Metaphysics to be the very 
first impulse for the philosophy: «For from 
wonder men, both now and at the first, began to 
philosophize» [Aristotle, 1896: 9]. The presence 
of a wonder makes the eyes to be widely opened, 
so there are no any obstacles for the look from 
the inside or for the light from the outside. Most 
intriguing for us, the philosophers, must be the 
situation where this widely opened eyes shine on 
the face of the skilled or sophisticated person – 
would it be the philosopher or the scientist. How 
could they become so naïve as to see the light 
and to grasp what they have seen in the obvious 
statements? Is it necessary for the philosopher to 
come back to the primordial simplicity? Finally, 
closing this same passage into the circle, what 
is the relationship between these two situations, 
«naïve» and «sentimental»?
Methods
For sure, the philosophers need some kind 
of method to move from subtlety to simplicity or 
vice versa. In fact, here as elsewhere, it would 
be better to speak not about methodos, but about 
hodos. Once upon a time Richard McKeon 
stated that «“Method” (methodos) was used by 
Aristotle to signify a “path to” the investigation 
of a scientific subject matter or the solution 
of the scientific problem and he distinguished 
“methods” from “paths” or “ways” (hodos) 
constructed in universal arts for the statement of 
arguments or descriptions or accounts applicable 
to any problem or subject matter» [McKeon, 1987: 
29]. The method makes the way straight because 
it appears to be the consequence of the rules. 
However, there are no any rules or even principles 
for the one who paves the path. On the pages of 
this article I will discuss some typical situations 
occurred when the philosopher smashes this way. 
I also take into account the fact that only the 
extraordinary popularity of the word «method» 
makes the philosophers to reflect on method even 
then they in fact look for the path.
Discussion
Edmund Husserl in the first and third books 
of his Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology 
and to a phenomenological philosophy writes 
on the method of clarification as if it would 
be the path to the clarity. This method of 
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clarification is a way to fulfill the very goal of 
the phenomenology. «It must expose to its views 
events of pure consciousness as examples <and> 
make them perfectly clear; within the limits 
of this clarity it must analyze and seize upon 
their essences, trace with insight the essential 
interconnections, formulate what is beheld in 
faithful conceptual expressions which allow their 
sense to be prescribed purely by what is beheld 
or generically seen; and so forth» [Husserl, 
1983: 150]. Therefore, the phenomenologist (or 
the contemporary transcendental philosopher) 
is the one who makes clear, analyzes, seizes 
upon, traces with insight, formulates in faithful 
expressions. He has to clothe some «events of pure 
consciousness» with the suitable words. Just from 
the beginning, there are two different problems 
to be stated: first of them is the clarification of 
the images while the second one is the choice of 
the words. If the philosopher tries to solve the 
first one, he will have to focus his gaze upon the 
subject matter and in doing so he himself or his 
gaze will move from here to there and then back, 
and back again.
In a way, the assertoric seeing and the 
apodictic intellectual seeing resemble each 
other. «We need a more universal term which 
encompasses in its signification both assertoric 
seeing and apodictic intellectual seeing» [Husserl, 
1983: 330]. Everybody’s gaze may grasp not only 
the surface details but also the general view 
without any details. However, this curious idler 
may not as well divert his thoughts from the 
details to see the general view. This is the task for 
the philosopher, and that is why we must make 
a distinction between the simple seeing and the 
intellectual contemplation. The philosopher, or 
apodictic intellectual seer, looks not for the best 
sightseeing place but for the insight. He focuses 
not upon all the changeable details but upon the 
unchanged general view. The phenomenologist, 
or the philosopher of these days, undertakes the 
serial movements from one degree of clarity to 
another to find out his own place in the nearness of 
the essence. Husserl wrote: «…[J]ust as there is for 
the moment corresponding to it in the individual 
there is for any essence an absolute nearness, so 
to speak, in which its givenness, compared to 
the series of degrees of clarity, in an absolute – 
i.e., a pure givenness of it itself»1 [Husserl, 1983: 
153]. Everybody knows these serial movements 
as the movements of a wanderer who searches 
the best observation point to know where to go 
next or as the movements of a hand that tries to 
make the tuning precise. The philosopher direct 
his movements from the remoteness to givenness 
and design them to separate the solid clarity from 
the fluid inclarity. «That which floats before us in 
fluid inclarity, with a greater or less intuitional 
remoteness, must therefore be brought into 
normal nearness and made perfectly clear before 
it can be used as the basis for a correspondingly 
valuable eidetic intuition in which essences and 
eidetic relationships intended to attain perfect 
givenness» [Husserl, 1983: 153]. This activity 
looks like the interior of a creamery or perhaps 
like the genesis of the planets from the primordial 
fog, but in fact, Husserl describes our common 
way to idea, or eidos. Husserl as well as the pre-
Socratic philosophers and Plato in his «cave 
symbol» before him has passed this way through. 
In fact, all the ordinary women or men usually 
grasp the idea as the general view or overview. 
However, as far as the eidetic phenomenology 
tries to see not the facts, but the essences, Husserl 
must distinguish the mere seeing from the insight 
into the ideas as such.
The transitions from one degree of clarity to 
another Husserl describes in a long but beautiful 
passage. «Thus the method, which is fundamental 
part of method of all eidetic science, universally 
requires proceeding step by step. The intuitions 
of style particulars serving the seizing upon 
essences may be already clear to an extent which 
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allows for acquiring an essentially universal 
moment which, however, does not extend as far 
as the guiding intention; clarity is lacking on the 
side partaking to more detailed determinations 
of the essences combined with <what had been 
attained>, consequently there is a need to bring 
the exemplificatory single particulars nearer or 
to provide anew more suitable ones in which the 
confusedly and obscurely single traits intended to 
stand out and, consequently, can become given 
with maximum clarity» [Husserl, 1983: 156–
157]. The philosopher has to move his glance step 
by step to find out the only exemplary particular 
that would arrest the guiding intention and 
organize the intentional structure, or style. Even 
the illumination is not necessary for the insight. 
In the darkness of the undetermined areas, it 
happens that the knocking at the door of intuition 
is possible. «A bringing nearer is effected here 
throughout, even in the sphere of obscurity. What 
is obscurely intended to comes closer to us in 
its own manner; finally it knocks at the door of 
intuition, but even so it need not come in (and 
perhaps it cannot “because of psychological 
obstructions”» [Husserl, 1983: 157]. Nobody 
can distinguish the particulars perfectly well in 
the obscurity of the unknown areas though the 
observer may anticipate some kind of the insight 
here too. Anyway, the halo of darkness always 
surrounds the particulars given in the circle of light. 
«It should also be mentioned that what is given at 
any particular time is usually surrounded by a 
halo of undetermined determinability, which has 
its mode of being brought closer “explicatively” in 
becoming separated into a number of intendings 
[Vorstellungen]; at first it still may be in the 
realm of obscurity, but then within the sphere of 
givenness until what is intended to comes into the 
sharply illuminated circle of perfect givenness» 
[Husserl, 1983: 157]. What will the philosopher 
see when he uses the method of clarification to 
provide the insight? Sometimes he will see the 
style particulars perfectly clear so everybody 
may choose the exemplary particular, sometimes 
in the obscurity he will anticipate the knocking at 
the door of his intuition, and he always grasp the 
halo that surrounds every illuminated sphere.
We may clarify the concepts of our 
predecessors and we may make the new step 
through the sphere still illuminated because 
of our first attempts to clarify. «The process 
of clarification… means two things: making a 
concept clear by recourse to fulfilling intuition, 
and, second, a process of clarification executed in 
the sphere of intuition itself» [Husserl, 1980: 89]. 
In any case, the clarification means not only the 
transposition of the attention from one point to 
another, but also the selection of the words. The 
philosophical and scientific heritage is nothing 
more or less than the wide set of the concepts. 
In order to clarify the concepts the philosopher 
has to bind them with the insights of the intuition. 
Afterwards it is possible to make the next steps 
to the further clarification. Despite this fact, the 
«method», or the way, of clarification is both 
useful and necessary. «A thing is not given; a 
thing-concept is not brought to actual clarity, if 
a thing is merely seen. A phantom is also seen, 
a mere seeing also yields no more than what 
corresponds to the phantom, namely as sensory 
schema» [Husserl, 1980: 88–89]. Thus far, the 
observer needs the clarification just to set apart 
the phantoms or the usual mistakes and to 
perceive the structure of the given world beyond 
them. When the observer makes this distinction 
between the simple ability to see and the insight, 
he will comprehend how complex the adventures 
of his eye are.
Husserl describes in the passages above the 
illustrious picture of the operations with the images 
and the darkness. However, there exists also the 
problem of the words used in these descriptions. 
As long as the insight and the naming coincide 
in space and time, the clarification process is 
– 1256 –
Sergey A. Nikitin. The Method of Clarification and the Figurative Language
two-fold. Husserl unambiguously prefers the 
ambiguous words of the ordinary language to the 
logical or mathematical formulae. «The words 
used may derive from the common language, they 
may be ambiguous and their changing senses may 
be vague. As soon as they “coincide” with the 
intuitionally given in the manner characteristic 
of an actual expression, they take on a definite 
sense as their actually present and clear sense, hic 
et nunc; and starting from there we can fix them 
scientifically» [Husserl, 1983: 151–152]. We know 
all the disadvantages of the ordinary language 
fair well. Yet the technical terminology is much 
worse being the road to the dead-end hidden in 
the darkness of senselessness. «Since, for good 
reasons in view of the existing ambiguities of 
common usage, foreign technical terms should, 
in so far as possible, be avoided in the generally 
accepted language, there is a continuing need for 
caution and for frequent re-examination to see 
whether what was fixed in the earlier context is 
actually employed in the same sense in the new 
one» [Husserl, 1983: 152]. The one who likes to 
preserve the insight has to compare the different 
contexts. The earlier context is even better as 
far as «clarification must follow precisely the 
stages of the constitution of the exemplary 
object of intuition in question» [Husserl, 1980: 
88]. However, we must change context for the 
further clarification of the object still grasped 
by the intuition. The language consisted of the 
conventional signs must be the worst possible 
context as concerns the saving of the insight. 
Husserl strictly opposes the indirect symbolism 
of the mathematics or the natural and technical 
sciences for it excludes or ceases the very 
possibility of the insight. «The art of continually 
inventing new symbolic procedures is practiced 
more and more perfectly and its rationality 
is essentially one that depends merely on the 
symbolism and from the outset presupposes, 
without insight, the value of the symbols. What 
was relatively a matter of insight on a lower 
level is symbolized anew on a higher level and 
robbed of evidentness (as a superfluous burden 
of thought), and so the sciences become what we 
know them as: factories turning out very valuable 
and practically useful propositions – factories 
in which one can work as laborer and inventive 
technician, factories from which, as a practical 
man, one can without inner understanding derive 
products and at best comprehend the technical 
efficiency» [Husserl, 1980: 82]. Since «the 
clarification also has the function of giving old 
words the newly constituted sense» [Husserl, 
1980: 88], there must be the element of a fancy 
in all the intuitive attempts to grasp the essence, 
and Husserl knew it. He wrote: «Thus if one is 
fond of paradoxical phrases, one can actually 
say, and if one means the ambiguous phrase in 
the right sense, one can say in strict truth, that 
“feigning” [Fiktion] makes up the vital element 
of phenomenology as of every other eidetic 
science, that feigning is the source from which 
the cognition of “eternal truths” is fed» [Husserl, 
1983: 160]. This phrase is not that paradoxical, as 
it seems to be for the fictional language is perhaps 
the best way to grasp the essence.
In his lectures and notes published under 
the title Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and 
Memory Husserl states: «Consciousness of what 
is not present belongs to the essence of phantasy. 
We live in present; we have a perceptual field of 
regard. In addition, however, we have appearances 
that present something not present lying entirely 
outside this field or regard» [Husserl, 2005: 63]. 
Usually we see the phantasy appearances as 
«empty phantoms» [Husserl, 2005: 64], they 
are colorless and unsaturated. However, «there 
are often cases in which phantasy appearances 
present themselves as vigorous formations, 
cases in which they bring to intention objects 
that are sharply drawn, plastic and color 
saturated» [Husserl, 2005: 63–64]. In any case, 
– 1257 –
Sergey A. Nikitin. The Method of Clarification and the Figurative Language
every phantasy appearance changes, manifests 
its «protean character» [Husserl, 2005: 66], so 
«we can speak of one phantasy presentation with 
discontinuous representation» [Husserl, 2005: 
67]. The observer of the sensuous perception has 
at his disposal only the image, the «representing» 
object and the «represented» object [Husserl, 
2005: 21]. That is all. Situation changes when 
the observer looks upon his own phantasies: he 
has at his disposal the marvelous variety of the 
non-existent objects. «Anyone who phantasies 
has an image experience. Something objective 
appears to him. However, no one considers 
this appearance to be an appearance of the 
object itself. Certainly no one takes this faint, 
fluctuating appearance – now rising fleetingly 
to the surface, now disappearing, its content 
changing in so many ways as it does so – to be 
the appearance of the object» [Husserl, 2005: 27]. 
The different image experiences change each 
other in a free play. They come, they vacillate for 
a moment or so, they go away. It is this vacillation 
we need to see the essence as clear as possible. 
«The apprehension that constitutes the image 
object is at the same time the foundation for the 
presentation that, by means of the image object; 
and in normal phantasy presentation and image 
presentation the act of meaning is aimed at the 
latter, directed toward it alone» [Husserl, 2005: 
2]. The unchained phantasy invents or creates 
the subject matter and that makes Husserl to 
choose the unchained phantasy as the best kind 
of the pursuit for the clarification of the essence. 
Husserl here mentions the overwhelming force 
of the images, which can provide the material 
layer for the newly creating essences.
Taking into account the uselessness of the 
formal languages, we must advert to the simple 
language used by the ordinary (or even illiterate) 
people in their everyday life. What another kind 
of language is better to make the gaze clear? 
However, the authors who describe these variants 
of speech sometimes exaggerate the effects of the 
ordinary language.
The outstanding American writer Robert M. 
Pirsig in his second novel Lila. An Inquiry into 
Morals compared simple language of the Native 
Americans with the sophisticated language of the 
Whites. The Native Americans lived the life on 
their own. They did only necessary things. They 
never used ineffective or just ceremonial gestures. 
«… [W]hen the Indians entered the teepee, or 
went out, or added logs, or passed the ceremonial 
peyote, or pipe, or food, they just did these things. 
They didn’t go about doing them. They just did 
them. There was no waste motion. When they 
moved a branch into the fire to build it up they 
just moved it. There was no sense of ceremony. 
They were engaged in ceremony but the way 
they did it there wasn’t any ceremony» [Pirsig, 
1992: 43]. It was the ceremonial world without 
any kind of the overt ceremony. The speech of 
the Native Americans was also direct and simple. 
«The directness and simplicity was in the way 
they spoke, too. They spoke the way they moved, 
without any ceremony. It seemed to always come 
from deep within them. They just said what they 
wanted to say. Then they stopped. It wasn’t just 
the way they pronounced the words. It was their 
attitude – plain-spoken, he thought…» [Pirsig, 
1992: 43–44]. The protagonist of the novel or 
perhaps Pirsig himself used the wordplay as he 
compared the speech of the Indians to the Plains 
they lived on. «They were spoken in the language 
of the plains. This was the pure Plains American 
dialect he was listening to. It wasn’t just Indian. 
It was white too…» [Pirsig, 1992: 44]. This 
plain speech was not something specific to the 
languages of the Native Americans. Everybody 
could remember as Pirsig really did Woody 
Guthrie songs or the cowboy movies (westerns) as 
the sources of the same plain speech. Sometimes 
the Native Americans used the language that 
was not their own (American English) but they 
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were not imitators even at that. «…They were 
not imitating. If there’s one thing these people 
didn’t do it was imitate. Everything was coming 
straight from the heart. That seemed to be the 
whole idea – to get straight things down to a point 
where everything’s coming straight on, direct, no 
imitation. But if they weren’t imitating, why did 
they talk this way? Why were they imitating?» 
[Pirsig, 1992: 44]. The protagonist ate some 
peyote with his friend anthropologist and the 
Indians. And then the huge peyote illumination 
came to him: «They’re the originators!» [Pirsig, 
1992: 44]. The Native Americans had originated 
the imitative (American English) language. This 
language was not native for the Indians but they 
used it as if it was one. Along with the language 
the Native Americans had created the main traits 
of the white American character. «The Europeans 
usually think the Americans to be sloppy and 
untidy, but the Americans imagine the Indians 
to have just the same traits of character». The 
Indians had created this kind of all-American 
character by their manner to speak. «Indians don’t 
talk to fill time. When they don’t have anything to 
say, they don’t say it. When they don’t say it, they 
leave the impression of being a little ominous. 
In the presence of this Indian silence, whites 
sometimes get nervous and feel forced as a matter 
of politeness or kindness to fill the vacuum with 
a kind of small-talk which often says one thing 
and means another. But these well-mannered 
circumlocutions of aristocratic European speech 
are “forked-tongue” talk to the Indian and are 
infuriating. They violate his morality. He wants 
you to either speak from the heart or keep quiet. 
This has been the source of Indian-white conflict 
for centuries and although the modern white 
American personality is a compromise of that 
conflict, the conflict still exists» [Pirsig, 1992: 
50–51]. The white Americans seemed to be 
the simpletons for the Europeans, although for 
the Native Americans the speech of the whites 
looked like a spider web. «…To the Indians, 
whites seemed like spiders when they talked. 
They sat there and smiled and said things they 
didn’t mean, and all the time their mind was 
spinning a web around Indian. They got so lost 
in their own web-spinning thoughts they didn’t 
even see that the Indian was watching them too 
and could see what they were doing» [Pirsig, 
1992: 51]. The plain speech of the simple people 
is opposed to the spider web of the cultural 
speech. This contraposition had to become the 
ultimate foundation for the every discussion of 
the preferences of the simple language and direct 
speech over the sophisticated language and the 
polite meaningless words.
An ability to express the state of affairs in 
just a few necessary words will absolve from 
superfluous deeds. If you are on the far side of the 
word web you will be able to see clear. As opposed 
to our meaningless talks, the direct speech of the 
primitive and non-educated people allows seeing. 
The simple usage of the language is so closely 
connected with doing and making that it gives 
way to make the life what you like it to be and 
not only to do the deeds in a life you are doomed 
to. Both the language and the life will become 
ceremonial without overt ceremonies. And many 
other natural and supernatural properties the 
authors interested in these kinds of speech and 
language usually ascribe to them.
Sometimes they even sanctify the simple 
language. When the archpriest of the Russian 
Old Believers and one of the prominent authors 
of the movement finish his autobiography, 
he referred to his own speech as «viakanie» 
(blathering) [Abbakum, 2010: 73]. For sure, we 
have here the kind of self-humiliation. However, 
we have just read his autobiography and have 
been able to use our own evaluation, not the 
author’s one. We have just experienced him to 
be the eminent and almost perfect writer. We 
have more than enough reasons to treat his 
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evaluation of his speech as a kind of a strategy. 
Abbacum had called his speech a blathering 
in an attempt to humiliate himself but not his 
speech. In any case, the uncolored language had 
been the worthy material for the preaching. On 
the contrary, the rhetorically colored speech of 
the official church had been irrelevant in such a 
case. The good preacher had had to break away 
the web of the words woven of the rhetorical 
devices by the government officials and the 
priests of the fallen church. The true believers 
had had to put off all the wiles of the official 
church and of the government embodied in the 
words of the rhetorically educated people.
This or that variant of the simple language 
may not be so close to the Holy Writ, but it usually 
exhibits the great health and purity. Anyway, 
all these imaginary stories about imaginary 
plain speech are doubtful. All the flowers of 
the rhetoric bloom in the simplest words of the 
everyday speech. Everybody knows a set of 
the arguments concerning the inner rhetorical 
character of the simplest speech. César-Chesnau 
Dumarsais points it as follows: «In effect, I am 
persuaded that it is possible to find out more 
figures while you spend only one day on the 
Central Market, than during a long time in the 
Academy» [Dumarsais, 1818: 3]. For sure, he 
speaks on the urban culture, but the language 
of the servants and of the tradesmen displays 
us at the same time its figural background and 
the vital simplicity of its forefront. The simplest 
language could be the most figural one. This is 
true as concerns the language of the Scriptures 
as well. Gerard Genette argues: «Genesis says: 
“And there was light”. Nothing is more marked 
than this simplicity: it is the very figure, indeed 
the perfectly obligatory figure, of the sublime» 
[Genette, 1982: 48]. The contraction is not the 
way from the figural language to the direct or 
uncolored speech. Just the opposite, it is an 
example of the rhetorical device exercised. 
Perhaps the simplicity of the figure is the source 
for the force that is enough to create the reality 
as sacred as the reality of the Holy Writ.
The rhetoric has known this force for the 
centuries. The classical tractate On the Sublime 
by the so-called Pseudo-Longinus describes the 
impact of the figural language on the reader or 
hearer. «This striking image, being thrown in by 
the speaker in the midst of his proofs, enables 
him by one bold stroke to carry all mere logical 
objection before him. In all such cases, our nature 
is drawn towards that which affects it most 
powerfully: hence, an image lures us away from 
an argument: judgment is paralyzed; matters of 
fact disappear from view, eclipsed by the superior 
blaze. Nor is it surprising that we should be thus 
affected; for when two forces are thus placed in 
juxtaposition, the stronger must always absorb 
into itself the weaker» [Longinus, 1890: 36]. 
The «striking image» is not taken from the outer 
space of the other realities. The playful painter 
does not draw the image mentioned above over 
the written text. In fact, any writer has to create 
both the images and the statements from the same 
matter. He has to produce his images as well as 
his proofs from the words and by the words. He 
uses the same means to achieve two opposite 
aims at the same place and nearly at the same 
time. In this way, he creates the place called text 
where the images may break off the statements 
and absorb their remains.
On the one side, the freely floating 
imagination creates the material foundation for 
the ideas. On the other side, the images may 
destroy the rational content of the statements, or 
ideas. Paul de Man has seen the same situation in 
Friederich Nietzsche and described it as a kind of 
rhetorical «aporia» between the language of tropes 
and the language of persuasion. «Considered as 
persuasion, rhetoric is performative but when 
considered as system of tropes, it deconstructs 
its own performance» [De Man, 1979: 131]. The 
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incessant strife between the persuasive tropes and 
the effects of persuasion is the very essence of the 
rhetoric. This inner strife makes every text such a 
complex structure that is hardly imaginable in the 
simple and direct speech. One could not blame 
the hypocrisy on the people whose words in no 
way disagree with their deeds. The only possible 
source of the «rhetoricity» of the simple speech is 
not the word neither deed but the very situation of 
speech. In the situation of the utterance, the one 
who speaks must transfer or translate the infra-
situational acts into the common words with their 
inherent rhetoric. This transitional process creates 
the obstacles for the stare inside the words. They 
are more or less accidental words, they are the 
bad metaphors, erased or forced
In his prose poem «Rhetoric» French poet 
Francis Ponge treats the innovation in rhetoric 
as a kind of the salvation for it «save some 
youngsters from the suicide and some other 
youngsters from the careers of the police officer 
or firefighter» [Ponge, 1987: 157]. Any attempts 
to create rhetoric anew are extremely necessary 
for those youngsters who feel repulsion not to 
become themselves but to live through some 
other persons’ life. Their greatest obstacle is 
their speech. «The words are made not by me 
and they express themselves: they never express 
me» [Ponge, 1987: 157]. Only the simpletons 
like police officers or firefighters just use the 
common words. The persons who like to become 
themselves or the poets must change the words. 
«It is worth and useful to teach art of resistance 
to words, to say only what one want to say, the art 
to violate the words and to subject them to one’s 
power. As a result to found a rhetoric, or rather 
to teach everybody to find out his own rhetoric, 
is a public work of rewarding» [Ponge, 1987: 
157]. Everybody is obliged to search his own 
rhetoric for the standard language of the words 
that can express nobody’s wishes not to become 
an impenetrable obstacle for a gaze that would 
look for the essence of the world. To find out the 
perfect word means to win the two-dimensional 
struggle. First, it is the struggle against the settled 
words and speech turns. Second, it is the struggle 
against accidental and approximate turns of 
speech.
Conclusion
As long as everyday language of ordinary 
people is capable to fasten an insight, the clarity 
of a sight is in a way connected with simple and 
plain speech. Exaggerated all of apologia of 
ordinary language are, they only confirm this 
fact. The usage of the rhetorical trops or figures 
creates all the unconceivable effects of an 
everyday language. The internal contradiction 
of art of eloquence and a seeming naturalness of 
popular speech represents one more reason of an 
ambiguity and of a misty gaze. That is why the 
opening of rhetorical character of an ordinary 
language, becomes a necessary condition of the 
glance clearing. Deleting of metaphors during 
creation of new versions of rhetoric is directly 
conformed to free variations in phantasy.
1 The italics here as elsewhere in the text were used by the authors cited.
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Метод прояснения и фигуральный язык
С.А. Никитин
Уральский федеральный университет им. Б.Н. Ельцина 
Россия 620083, Екатеринбург, пр. Ленина, 51
Статья посвящена отношениям феноменологии и риторики. Эдмунд Гуссерль приблизительно 
сто лет тому назад исследовал, описал, а затем использовал в эйдетической феноменологии 
примечательную способность каждого автора создавать воображаемые объекты при помощи 
обычных слов. Сегодня мы стремимся отыскать в классических текстах Гуссерля намек на 
то, каков лучший путь или метод прохождения сквозь слова и обретения возможности видеть 
ясно. Следовательно, цель этой статьи в том, чтобы определить и описать возможные пути 
сквозь иллюзию так называемой прямой речи к пониманию идеи. Поскольку предмет статьи – 
легко преобразующийся процесс преобразования присутствующих слов в отсутствующие 
изображения, она приводит к выводу в форме выбора. Этот выбор предсказан предложенным 
еще Гуссерлем описанием так называемых свободных вариаций в фантазии. Мы полагаем, что 
эти вариации будут риторическим сопротивлением обычным словам, своего рода ластиком, 
который слой за слоем стирает метафоры.
Ключевые слова: риторика, эйдетическая феноменология, очевидность, фантазия, метод 
прояснения, прямая речь, образный язык.
